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Serbia and Montenegro*  
For all the talk of “history in the making” in first reactions to the agreement between 
Belgrade and Podgorica, the spotlight is actually on the dustbin of history: 
Milosevic’s “Third Yugoslavia” is dead and there will be no more incarnations. First 
reactions to the new-born “Serbia and 
Montenegro” covered a whole spectrum of 
emotions, ranging from “a freak of a state” 
or “a rotten compromise” to “a new 
beginning.”1 Fact is that Javier Solana seems 
to have found a middle way in-between 
federation and confederation2 – at least for 
the time being. In three years (at the most!), 
the day of reckoning will come. For the 
moment, the political deadlock has been 
broken and a window of opportunity has 
been created for reform policies and regional co-operation. A comparison between the 
agreement of 14 March and the two “platforms” that defined the negotiating positions 
one and a half years ago throws the embedded compromises and innovations into 
relief. A second comparison with the political realities in Belgrade, Podgorica … and 
Pristina reveals the agreement’s limitations and deficits. Despite all sobering thoughts, 
however, the symbolic value and regional consequences of this “small step” should 
not be dismissed too lightly: The dice have been cast and political actors will have to 
reposition themselves accordingly.  
 
Breaking the Deadlock 
The relations between Belgrade and Podgorica had been deadlocked ever since Milo 
Djukanovic and his Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) beat Milosevic’s 
confederates in Montenegro on a pro-independence ticket in the 1997 presidential and 
the 1998 parliamentary elections. His victory revealed the fundamental flaw of the 
                                               
*  This paper was written in the framework of the joint Southeast Europe activities of the 
Bertelsmann Foundation and the Center for Applied Policy Research. I would like to thank Stefani 
Weiss (Bertelsmann Foundation) for suggesting the topic and Florian Bieber (ECMI) for commenting 
on an earlier draft.    
1  „Balkan Media Divided on Historic Deal,“ BBC News (15.03.2002) 
2  For lack of a better term, the new entity under international is referred to here as „state“, 
“union” and „federation“ interchangeably. 
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two-state federation created in 1992 from the remainder of Tito’s Yugoslav 
Federation: Serbia is 15 times bigger than Montenegro in terms of both territory and 
population. Consequently, the equality of the two unequal partners in the new mini-
federation deviated absurdly from the democratic principle of “one person – one 
vote.” As long as Milosevic’s SPS de facto ruled in both republics and on the federal 
level, this structural problem could be ignored. With Montenegro’s pro-Western 
reform policies and Serbia’s nationalist paralysis diverging more and more, 
Montenegro became independent in all but name and the Yugoslav Federation 
became a dead letter. On the eve of the epochal elections in the fall of 2000, 
Milosevic eliminated the principle of equality of the two constituent republics in law 
to restore Serb hegemony.3  
The deadlock became an acute political dilemma after Milosevic ouster. Milo 
Djukanovic had made his political fortune on the independence ticket, but under the 
new circumstances, he was driven by his supporters and political allies to go for a 
referendum, well knowing that the population is equally divided on the issue and well 
knowing that the West was prepared go to great length to prevent such a referendum. 
Actually, in 1996, Djukanovic miscalculated, expecting Milosevic to lose the 
elections, and opted for independence. In 2000, he miscalculated again, expecting 
Milosevic to win the elections, and boycotting the federal elections -. As a 
consequence, his natural allies, the reform-oriented and pro-Western DOS took over 
power in Serbia, but had to make a coalition with the reactionary Montenegrin 
opposition on the federal level.  
The recent breakthrough after many rounds of fruitless negotiations is not to 
be blamed on “diplomatic arm-twisting” by Javier Solana only. As all players came to 
realise that they had manoeuvred themselves and others into a “lose-lose” situation, 
the conditionality of the EU perspective provided economic incentives as well as a 
welcome excuse. Zoran Djindjic must have realised that the stand-off and bickering 
over competencies between federation and republic was to the detriment of the reform 
drive and international credibility of his political program. His political competitor 
Vojislav Kostunica saw his lead in popularity diminish in comparison with Djindjic 
and other younger reformers – a development partly due to the powerlessness of his 
presidential position. Last, but not least, the nationalist opposition of former 
                                               
3  Mark Thompson, „Yugoslavia’s Death is Balkans’ Gain,“ BBC News Online (15.03.2002) 
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Milosevic parties witnessed the once proud Yugoslavia become defunct, with a quasi-
independent state in Montenegro and a quasi-protectorate in Kosovo.  
In Podgorica, his narrow victory on 22 April 2001 in the parliamentary 
elections and the rising popularity of the SNP in recent polls have determined 
Djukanovic’s reluctance to implement his promise for a referendum on independence. 
Torn between his coalition partners who wanted the referendum now and the pro-
Yugoslav opposition with the polls showing a waning majority in favour of 
independence - the votes of the ethnic minorities (in favour) would actually decide on 
independence4, Djukanovic’s political survival depends on finding an elegant way 
backtracking on the “path of independence” – and he knew that all along.  
 
The EU as Honest Broker? 
Ever since Javier Solana took on the “mission impossible” to find middle ground 
between Belgrade and Podgorica, criticism became louder and louder. Surprisingly, 
Solana’s main critics were not found in Djukanovic’s Democratic Party of Socialists 
(DPS). Recently, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the International 
Crisis Group (ICG) in Brussels published an open letter to Javier Solana concerning 
Montenegro. One part of their critique concerns the EU’s methods of “applying 
extreme pressure to just one side” in order to “bull-dozer” Podgorica towards the 
EU’s preferred solution.5 As several participants to the negotiations have indicated, 
Solana has indeed made ample use of a prospective Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement between “Yugoslavia” and the EU with its immediate economic 
advantages and its alluring promise of future EU membership. Thus, the EU used its 
hegemony as a regional economic power to force a state union on “unwilling 
partners.” After the euphoria more than a year ago of finally having democratic 
negotiation partners and two constructive and apparently compatible platforms, the 
actual talks between Belgrade and Podgorica soon stalled in a “consent not to 
consent” and had to be revitalised by EU intervention and mediation in December 
2001.6 No doubt, Solana’s role went far beyond “good offices,” but eventually the 
                                               
4  ICG, „Montenegro - Time to Decide: Pre-Election Briefing“ (18.04.2002) 
5  ICG/CEPS media release, „EU Pressure on Montenegro is ‚Unwise’“ (Brussels 14.02.2002) 
6  „Serbian and Montenegrin Experts on the Future of Yugoslavia,“ AIM Podgorica 
(13.01.2002) 
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principle of “regional ownership” will require a democratic verification of the 
political deal by all three parliaments.7 
 The other half of the critique concerns the actual “dictated” outcome of the 
negotiations - “a democratic Montenegro in a democratic Yugoslavia.” This solution 
is considered “economically and politically unwise.”8 Solana’s attempts to keep 
Serbia and Montenegro together were more often than not understood as a blunt 
attempt to save the status quo of the “good old” Yugoslav Federation with some 
minor, cosmetic modifications. Consequently, the EU would end up polarising the 
parties and quasi supporting the line of the reactionary SNP nationalists in 
Montenegro and the parties of the former Milosevic coalition in Serbia. Pro-
independence Montenegrin parties, Western think tanks and even some Serbian 
intellectuals carried this argument.9 Proponents of Montenegro’s independence 
consistently painted a black-and-white picture of the FRY as the state associated with 
the reactionary and repressive Milosevic regime and of Montenegro as a paradise of 
pro-European reforms. 
 There certainly is reason to doubt the original transition optimism of the 
Djindjic team and ample evidence of “lagging reforms” in Serbia, due at least partly 
to the power struggle between Kostunica and Djindjic.10 The Milosevic past, however, 
makes a Yugoslavia neither illegitimate as a state nor per se reform-resistant. Nor is 
Montenegro an unqualified success story in terms of political and economic reform.  
The argument that Yugoslavia in its three forms - the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes (1918-1945); the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(1945-1992) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2002) – was “a historic 
error”11 or that “the FRY is an anti-European and anti-democratic state”12 
reintroduces the ideal of nation-state and the primacy of national self-determination 
through the backdoor. Qualifying for “Europe” depends on functional states and their 
capability of reform towards pluralist democracy and market economy. In this respect, 
Serbia and Montenegro each have their own specific problems and deficits, but both 
                                               
7  Veseljko Koprivica, „Montenegro Following the Visit of Javier Solana. Good Services 
Mission“ AIM (16.12.2001); Negotiating the Balkans (Gütersloh 2001), p. 1-2.  
8  ICG/CEPS media release, „EU Pressure on Montengro is ‚Unwise’“ (Brussels 14.02.2002) 
9  Morton Abramowitz, “Let the Montenegrins Have Their Say,” IHT (31.12.2001); RFE/RL 
6/46 II (11.03.2002). 
10  ICG,  
11  Matthias Rüb, „Etwas ganz Neues im Suedosten,“ FAZ (15.03.2002), p. 1.  
12  Milka Tadic-Mijovic, „Entretien avec Paul Williams,“ Monitor (21.12.2001) 
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still have a long way to go. Neither a nation-state nor a federation constitutes a 
panacea for these reform challenges.  
 Milo Djukanovic – by now the longest-ruling president in the region – was not 
born a dissident against Milosevic and conservative nationalism. Nevertheless, once 
the break between Belgrade and Podgorica had become irreversible, a pro-Western 
reform orientation was the only option for the quasi-independent mini-state. Despite a 
series of political, administrative and economic reforms, Montenegro still is among 
the world’s best in terms of international assistance per capita: The accusation of 
“simulated reforms” to please Western donors seems plausible.13 A significant part of 
economic activity – an estimated 40 to 60 per cent – is related to black market, mainly 
car rackets and cigarettes smuggling. The involvement of political parties and state 
administration is a foregone conclusion. The state needs foreign aid for social peace in 
a poverty-ridden country of rising unemployment, frequent electric power cuts and 
high inflation. The successful introduction of the euro (replacing the German mark as 
the national currency) earlier this year as such is by no means an indication of 
economic strength or aptitude: Podgorica is not bound by any criteria of economic 
convergence and the euro is more convenient for legal and not-so-legal international 
dealings than for an ailing local economy. Montenegro’s economic openness (3 per 
cent tariff average, 10 per cent for Serbia) may be an asset, but tourism certainly is not 
its main industry at the moment.14 To what extent Montenegro will really be able to 
consolidate its head start in economic reforms into a national economy that is healthy, 
sustainable and socially equitable remains to be seen. For the time being 
Montenegro’s reform economy has all the characteristics of a political myth.15  
 Once both Kostunica and Djindjic had expressed their willingness to consider 
a new form of federation with Montenegro (albeit not at all cost), Solana indeed 
ended up siding with the reactionary forces on the federal level and in Montenegro, 
cajoling the pro-independence parties into making major concessions to their 
program. Surely, a strong two-third majority in Montenegro in favour of 
independence would have had an impact on the EU approach, but a “50 per cent plus 
one” approach to such a fundamental issue of state sovereignty is neither particularly 
                                               
13  ESI, Rhetoric and Reform. A Case Study of Institution Building in Montenegro 1998-2001 
(Berlin 2001) 
14  ICG/CEPS media release, „EU Pressure on Montenegro is ‚Unwise’“ (Brussels 14.02.2002) 
15  Zoran Radulovic, “Montenegro: Economic Collapse Threatens Independence” IWPR Balkan 
Crisis Report 295 (09.11.2001); Martin Woker, “Montenegro als Test für die EU-Außenpolitik,” NZZ 
(21.02.2002), p. 7. 
  
  7 
stabilising nor democratic.16 (Therefore, the agreement insists on laws on referendum 
“taking full account of internationally recognised standards.”) At least publicly, the 
EU failed to distance its stabilisation objective from the die-hard conservatism of the 
local pro-Yugoslav forces.17 Miraculously, the eventual agreement favours the 
reformers rather than the reactionaries: A temporary freezing of the status issue in the 
form of “Serbia and Montenegro” allows pro-Western politicians to pursue their 
reform agendas with more drive, more concord – as the reform process towards 
regional and, first of all, European integration offers a broad basis of consensus. 
In sum, after the peaceful settlement of the minority conflict in Southern 
Serbia and the Ohrid Agreement of 13 August defining the road to a new inter-ethnic 
arrangement in Macedonia, the creation of “Serbia and Montenegro” marks a third 
feat for Javier Solana, the European Union’s High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. In all three cases, however, due to the fragility of the 
arrangements and the volatility of political aspirations, today’s triumph can easily 
become a Pyrrhic victory tomorrow.  
 
The Terms of the Agreement  
Typically, whereas the 2000 Djukanovic platform dwelled on the injustices of past 
Montenegro-Serbia relations and Montenegro’s “inalienable right to self-
determination” (more than a third of the platform text!), the preamble of the response 
by Kostunica and Djindjic highlighted the merits of federal arrangements, the historic 
and cultural ties as well as joint economic interests. The 14 March agreement contains 
only one terse reference to “elements of Serbian and Montenegrin statehood, 
stemming from the present-day factual situation and the historic rights of the two 
member states.” In Djukanovic’s vision the sovereignty and equality of the republics 
was key, while Belgrade argued on the basis of the “equality and operability” of the 
new federation.  
1. In the foremost set of issues, international status and representation, the current 
agreement predominantly follows the Belgrade position with a veto on unilateral 
secession by referendum and one international-law subject. Montenegro will not 
have international legal personality, but in return, the West has accepted the 
                                               
16  Dusan Reljic, “Montenegros Zukunft nach wie vor ungewiß,” SWP-Aktuell 3 (2002). 
Compare: Morton Abramowitz, “Let the Montenegrins Have Their Say,” IHT (31.12.2001). 
17  Florian Bieber, “The instrumentalisation of Minorities in the Montenegrin Dispute over 
Independence” ECMI Brief 8 (Flensburg 2002), pp. 7-8. 
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option of a referendum on independence after three years for the first time. To 
protect Montenegro against being swamped by Serbs in the joint institutions and 
representative positions, some (rather specific) safeguards have been built in for 
proportional international representation by rotation. The elections on both levels 
and the constitutional amendments set the new state apart from the current 
deficient FRY without giving up implicit succession under international law.  
2. Typically, as far as the more tangible issues of the relations between state and 
member-states and the division of competencies are concerned, the agreement is 
largely uninformative. Implicitly, the agreement dissociates itself from 
Djukanovic’s vision of sovereign states delegating part of their competencies to a 
subsidiary federal level. The Belgrade position contained two potentially 
conflicting definitions of the federal competencies – (1) the federal units’ need 
and common interest and/or (2) the elementary functions of internal and external 
operability – and the new agreement implicitly sympathises with “internal and 
external operability” as basic criteria. In terms of decision-making too, the spirit 
of the agreement seems to favour Belgrade’s “co-operative” over Podgorica’s 
impracticable “consensual” decision-making. As the text, however, contains not a 
single explicit statement on these issues, until the Constitutional Charter offers 
clarification (“the modalities for achievement of these goals shall be elaborated in 
parallel with the Constitutional Charter”), any partisan interpretation is permitted. 
Conversely, the range of joint competencies and ministries – defence, foreign 
affairs, internal and international economic relations as well as human and 
minority rights – copies the Montenegrin proposal with the exception of the 
common market and the convertible currency (euro).  
3. In the five common policy fields, the new agreement clearly combines elements 
from both positions. As Djukanovic demanded, conscripts will not be forced to 
serve outside their own republic against their will, but there will be only one 
federal army (a lesson from Bosnia). In line with the choice on international legal 
personality, foreign and defence policy are in the realm of the union. In internal 
and international economic relations, the actual competencies of the federation are 
less clear as the republics are allowed to keep their separate economies, 
currencies, and customs services. At this point, the agreement is almost as blank 
as the Belgrade platform. The domain of human and minority rights is an open 
question, neither platform foresaw such a ministry that might either become a 
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figurehead or a welcome excuse for the federal authorities to interfere in almost 
any republican legislation and political decision-making.  
4. In terms of state institutions and decision-making, the agreement tends to follow 
the more pragmatic Belgrade approach based on operability rather than an 
interpretation of equality. The impracticable mode of the two republican ministers 
of defence and foreign affairs taking turns at the respective nominal position on 
the federal level has been replaced by an “exchange of roles” by these two federal 
ministers and their respective deputies (from the other republic). Having a “real” 
federal foreign and defence minister strengthens the federal level and so does the 
abolishment of a strict parity of republics in each federal position: president and 
vice-president, each minister and his deputy. Taking into account the limited 
competencies of the federal government the agreement does not foresee a prime 
minister (unlike the Belgrade model) and the supervision of the ministerial council 
will be in the hands of the president (unlike the Podgorica model, there is no 
mention of a vice-president). The unicameral parliament elected by all citizens of 
Serbia and Montenegro points in the same direction, ignoring demands for a 
parallel system of republican parity next to individual democratic rights. The 
“certain positive discrimination” for Montenegro, however, requires specification. 
  
Politicking Elites and Strategic Realignments 
Both in Belgrade and in Podgorica key political figures that were not directly 
involved in the actual negotiations have pretended surprise and shock at the results. 
Most have recovered quickly and are beginning to reposition themselves accordingly. 
In Montenegro, Djukanovic, a political survivor of some repute, faces a tough 
political imbroglio. The president has tried to explain his decision to his supporters by 
underlining the fact that instead of stopping it, the agreement postpones, but in 
principle accepts a referendum on independence. Nevertheless, the Montenegrin 
government is not expected to survive Djukanovic’s surprise move: His coalition 
partner, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) is more radical than the DPS in its drive 
for independence, but cannot equal the liberal LSCG (supporting the government so 
far without participation) in its single-minded drive for statehood. SDP leader Ranko 
Krivokapic has already demanded the annulment of the agreement and an immediate 
referendum. The DPS’ offer to the liberals to join the government coalition seems to 
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be a red herring: In order to stay on top of the developments, Djukanovic will have to 
come to terms with the oppositional bloc “Together for Yugoslavia,” which reacted in 
more jubilant tones than the ruling parties. First meetings between Djukanovic and his 
SNP opponent Predrag Bulatovic date back to August 2001 when the referendum 
seemed a forgone conclusion. Although the president is in for tough negotiations, 
representatives of the oppositional People’s Party (NS) and the Socialist People’s 
Party (SNP) have cautiously signalled respect for Djukanovic “stopping at the brink 
of disaster” and even support for the agreement.18 All party leaders seem to be waiting 
for first indications of the popular mood.  
In Serbia, Kostunica, all smiles during the ceremony, poses as the real winner 
and tries to sweeten the bitter pill for his nostalgic supporters by proclaiming “the 
beginning of a new historic unity between Serbia and Montenegro.”19 The state 
envisaged in the agreement would have an improved presidential authority: Election 
by the parliament rather than the populace will diminish its popular legitimacy, but his 
competencies are more concretely defined.  Its implementation, moreover, would save 
him the choice between clinging to a largely symbolic Yugoslav presidency and 
running for the Serbian presidency (and thereby ending the federation single-
handedly). Early elections will be a test for the DOS coalition, for Djindjic’s ability to 
keep the 18-party coalition united and for Kostunica to reap the fruits of his declining, 
but still high popularity.20 Others like Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus have 
criticised the multitude of unanswered questions in the agreement, particularly in the 
economic field. Serb nationalism decrying the loss of Yugoslavia and Kostunica’s 
“betrayal” must realise that he may have secured the best possible deal for nationally 
minded Serbs, much better than a Yugoslavia existing on paper only. Conversely, 
many Serb leaders had been more than willing to let Montenegro go its own way, but 
most certainly did not want to incur a nationalist backlash at home by letting it go. 
 Thus, apart from the clear decision to name the new state “Serbia and 
Montenegro,” most contentious issues are left open, hoping for a constructive 
negotiation process to fill in the gaps. Thus, at the end of the day, the agreement of 14 
                                               
18  Michael Meyer-Resende, “The End of Yugoslavia – the End of Disintegration?” RFE/RL 
Newsline (Endnote) 6/55 II (22.03.2002); Mika Tadic Mijovic, “Montenegro: Djukanovic Plots 
Comeback” IWPR Balkan Crisis Report 324 (15.03.2002) 
19  Mika Tadic Mijovic, “Montenegro: Djukanovic Plots Comeback” IWPR Balkan Crisis Report 
324 (15.03.2002) 
20  Zeljko Cvijanovic, „Serbia: Joint State Deals Blow to Djindjic,“ IWPR Balkan Crisis Report 
324 (15.03.2002) 
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March is essentially a declaration of intent rather than a constitution blueprint. The 
agreement contains some bitter pills for each negotiating party and some partial 
victories. For a real negotiation process in regional ownership, this may be just the 
right mixture.  
The verification of the agreement by all three parliaments after elections will 
make for a hot summer: A mixed commission from the two republican parliaments 
and the federal parliament (currently not recognised by the Montenegrin government!) 
will present a Constitutional Charter in June on the basis of parliamentary 
conclusions. Thereafter, newly elected republican parliaments and eventually a 
federal parliament elected by the entire constituency of “Serbia and Montenegro” will 
pass democratic judgement on the state of a new type, dubbed “Solarium” by some 
sceptics. From the current perspective, it is hard to say who will be blocking the 
realisation of the agreement and who will be pushing it. Probably, negotiations will 
take months and it seems quite likely that the agreement will never be implemented in 
full. A velvet divorce by mutual agreement within the next three years may even be 
part of Djukanovic’s and Djindjic’s hidden agendas. Meanwhile, state formation as 
work in progress may, on the one hand, produce a substantial restructuring of the 
political landscape and, on the other hand, create a window of opportunity for real co-
operation based on shared interests. 
 
Open Questions and Hidden Caveats 
Like any good political deal, the Serbia-Montenegro agreement leaves a number of 
questions unanswered. The first crucial hiatus concerns its ambiguous character 
between federation and confederation: Implicitly, “Serbia and Montenegro” is a 
continuation of the 1992 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), as it is not a re-
federalisation after a declaration of independence, as envisaged by the Djukanovic 
platform. At the same time, the fact that the Constitutional Charter has to be passed by 
the parliaments of the member states after elections, however, indicates an 
institutional break with the (recent) past. Evidently, the negotiating parties have 
decided to tackle the political status issue first and leave the contentious economic 
issues open. Pressed for time, the EU seems to have accepted a looser form of union 
than envisaged in earlier blueprints.   
 The envisaged “loose union of a new type” would enable a clearer institutional 
relation between Serbia and the federal level, a precondition for rationalisation and 
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the elimination of the costly overlaps between Yugoslav and Serbian administrations. 
A number of FRY institutions not foreseen for the new union could be re-designated 
as institutions of the Serbian Republic (e.g. the National Bank). The main structural 
problem to be resolved, however, concerns the equality of two so unequal republics. 
Montenegro will have its veto in the Supreme Defence Council and in the federal 
parliament and its share of international representation. As long as there is a strategic 
consensus, the idea of a Montenegrin representing 8 million inhabitants of Serbia and 
a few hundred thousand Montenegrins in international organisations may even be 
bearable. In negotiations with IFIs, however, conflicting interests may easily destroy 
the credibility of the new union, both externally and internally. Implementing the 
agreement’s “special modes of representation for IFIs” will be a challenge. The same 
applies for the weighting of Montenegro’s democratic representation in federal 
decision-making: How to design a system preventing Serbia from outvoting its junior 
partner on each and every issue, whilst preventing Montenegro from applying its veto 
to get a disproportionate say in common policy making?  
The main deficit of the agreement – in that respect more similar to the 
Kostunica/Djindjic platform than to Djukanovic’s – concerns the economic 
integration of the two member-states. Although Djindjic had noted during the 
negotiations that he cared more for economic than for political integration, each 
member of the new state will retain its own economic, financial and customs systems 
and Montenegro its euro currency for the time being, much along the lines 
recommended in the ICG/CEPS letter to Solana.21 Montenegro may keep its lower 
tariffs, its convertible euro currency and a customs barrier between the two republics. 
Conversely, access for Montenegrins to Serbian institutions of higher education, 
medical care and other state services beyond the reach of a mini-state like 
Montenegro is likely to become an issue for negotiations. Although economic 
separation has many disadvantages, the current asymmetries do not allow for 
significant re-integration. Economic separation, however, is not so much a setback, 
but rather the acceptance of current realities. 
Federal Vice-President Miroljub Labus criticised the lack of clarity in terms of 
timetables and economic matters, noting that one year would be a reasonable time-
frame for the reintegration of markets. His one-year deadline refers to the expected 
                                               
21  ICG/CEPS media release, „EU Pressure on Montenegro is ‚Unwise’“ (Brussels 14.02.2002) 
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duration of the negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between 
the new state and the European Union, the first step towards full EU membership in 
10-15 years.22 The EU mediators and the negotiating parties gave priority to breaking 
the spell of the (political) status question, hoping that new synergies and economic 
momentum released by the integrative Stabilisation and Association Process towards 
full EU membership will make up for the evident disadvantages of economic 
separation.23 As the EU’s promise to support and monitor the intermediate bilateral 
harmonisation in the economic field and the eventual harmonisation under the aegis of 
the European common market indicates, the expectation is for economic policies to be 
more rational and controllable than the emotional and intractable status question. 
Economic re-integration could take place gradually as Serbia catches up and as EU 
integration becomes a closer prospect. 
 
Consequences for Regional Stability? 
Many in Serbia, nostalgic for the days of Tito, will regret the loss of the name 
“Yugoslavia” and the ideal of a multiethnic state it once implied. For many in Serbia 
and beyond, after the experiences of the past ten years, Yugoslavia stood only for 
Serb ethno-nationalism and ethnic cleansing. Conversely, after the extradition of 
Milosevic, dropping the name “Yugoslavia” is a second reassuring symbol for many 
in the region, a farewell to the era of ethnic conflict and human tragedy. Whatever its 
quality as a functioning state may be, the new name should be listed on the credit side 
in the balance sheet for “Serbia and Montenegro.” Dropping the name “Yugoslavia,” 
moreover, may give a new dimension and impetus to the on-going debate on Serb 
national identity and the Serbian state.  
The pivotal regional question relates to the consequences for the final status of 
Kosovo (and other potential status questions in the region, e.g. Republika Srpska or 
the Albanians in Macedonia). The main reason why the EU strongly objected to the 
idea of Montenegrin independence ever since Djukanovic took office, although the 
1991/1992 Badinter Commission had confirmed Montenegro’s right to self-
determination, was concern for a precedent followed by yet another round of state 
fragmentation in a region traditionally suffering from too many projects of state and 
                                               
22  Balkans Weekly (15.03.2002) 
23  Dusan Reljic, “Serbien und Montenegro engine sich über zukünftige staatliche Gemeinschaft,” 
SWP-Brennpunkte (2002) 
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nation building. Although Djukanovic and his coalition partner SDP occasionally 
invoked the last Montenegrin King Nikola in their bid for independence, the 
envisaged mini-state was characterised as a civic state with harmonious relations 
between the Montenegrin majority (62%), the Muslims (15%), the Serbs (9%) and the 
smaller minorities.24  
Therefore, Kosovo’s status was the main obstacle for Montenegro’s 
independence, although political leaders in Podgorica and Pristina never tired of 
denying any such nexus. Indeed, the Kosovar politicians will never abandon their 
aspirations for independence, no matter what kind of constitutional acrobatics the 
Montenegrins perform.25 An immediately backlash of a Montenegrin referendum on 
independence in Kosovo seems unlikely at the moment, but both in Brussels and in 
the region, the agreement has been applauded as an end to the Balkan trend of never-
ending state fragmentation in a Europe characterised by integration and the transfer of 
sovereign rights.  
The International Crisis Group was not the first to raise the question, what 
consequences the dissolution of the third Yugoslavia would have for the guarantee of 
its “sovereignty and territorial integrity” in resolution 1244, all the more so as this 
resolution referred to Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia, not of Serbia.26 As of now, the 
ensuing debate among specialists in international and constitutional law has academic 
relevancy only. “Serbia and Montenegro” becomes the successor state of the defunct 
FRY and the 14 March agreement includes an explicit precaution for a possible 
disintegration after three years: “If Montenegro withdraws from the state union, 
international documents related to the FRY, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 
1244 in particular, shall relate to and fully apply on Serbia as its successor.” Thus, this 
weaving fault in resolution 1244 has been repaired. (Strictly speaking, only the 
unlikely case of Serbia’s secession would unhinge resolution 1244.) The suggestion 
that this provision violates the resolution and re-introduces Serb sovereignty over 
Kosovo seems far-fetched: The UN resolution could not deny Kosovo being a 
province of the Serbian republic under the Yugoslav constitution and theoretically 
                                               
24  Tim Judah, “Montenegro’s Quest for Independence” BBC News (28.12.2000); Florian Bieber, 
“The instrumentalisation of Minorities in the Montenegrin Dispute over Independence,” ECMI Brief 8 
(Flensburg 2002) 
25  Matthias Rüb, „Etwas ganz Neues im Suedosten,“ FAZ (15.03.2002), p. 1. 
26  UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999), adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 
June 1999. 
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Serbia might uphold the defunct “shell” of the FRY even after Montenegro’s 
secession if only because of Kosovo.27  
Nevertheless, in three years (at the latest), the triangular Belgrade-Podgorica-
Pristina dilemma will come to a head again: In quick succession, the term of office of 
the Kosovar government, the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-
Government in Kosovo and the Serbian-Montenegrin moratorium on referenda will 
end. Three years, however, is a long time. What the agreement brokered by Solana 
may achieve is gaining time rather than playing for time. The new “union of states” 
erases the delusion of the defunct FRY that had become a danger in itself and offers a 
basic framework for new trilateral and regional arrangements. Even if the new state 
would be only a transitional solution, ending the constitutional confusion and political 
deadlock, it would be a historic achievement in the Balkan region. After all, the 
Balkans have never been known for giant leaps, and small steps may be safer and just 
as effective on an arduous road of protracted negotiations and political detours. 
 
                                               
27  Matthias Rüb, „Folgen der Einigung von Belgrad,“ FAZ (16.03.2002), p. 6. 
Tables 
 
   
Table 1 International Status and Representation 
 
International status International representation Referendum, elections and 
constitution 
Djukanovic 
Platform 
(28.12.2000) 
Independent and internationally 
recognised states 
Member-states autonomous in 
diplomatic representation. 
Harmonisation and co-
ordination within the Union. 
Referendum on independence 
and future union in Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Kostunica-
Djindjic 
Platform 
(10.01.2001) 
Internationally recognised 
federation with two federal 
units. 
By the federation Constitutional amendments 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Agreement 
(14.03.2002) 
Internationally recognised state 
with two republics 
Joint proportional 
representation. Parity in UN, 
OSCE, EU and CoE 
representation by rotation. 
Special modes of 
representation for IFIs. 
Three-year moratorium on 
referenda on secession. 
Elections for the republican 
parliaments, the president of 
the state as well as ministers 
and judges. Constitutional 
Charter drafted by commission 
on basis of parliamentary 
conclusions, submitted to 
republican and federal 
parliaments. Amendment of the 
republican constitutions. 
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Table 2 State and Member-States, Division of Competencies 
 
Union and republics Institutions and decision-
making 
Competencies of the Union 
Djukanovic 
Platform 
(28.12.2000) 
Member-states as holders of 
sovereignty, delegating part of 
their competencies. 
Competencies of the Union 
interpreted restrictively, as a 
rule performed by bodies of the 
member states. Equality and 
consensual decision-making. 
Defence, foreign policy, 
common market and 
convertible currency, 
protection of human and 
minority rights. 
Kostunica-
Djindjic 
Platform 
(10.01.2001) 
Autonomy of republics in all 
functions not referred to federal 
level, incl. direct co-operation. 
Functions performed at federal 
level minimal, defined by (1) 
the federal units’ need and 
common interest and/or (2) the 
elementary functions of 
internal and external 
operability. Co-operation 
between federal and republican 
bodies in decision-making and 
joint functions. Equality of the 
federal units. Dislocation of 
some federal institutions to 
Montenegro. 
Fully exercised: national 
defence, monetary and customs 
system, transportation, 
communication, foreign policy. 
Jointly exercised: protection of 
basic rights and freedoms (incl. 
social rights), other basics of 
economic system. 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Agreement 
(14.03.2002) 
- - 
Dislocation of some federal 
institutions to Montenegro. 
Defence, foreign policy, 
internal and international 
economic relations, protection 
of human and minority rights.  
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Table 3 Common Policy Fields 
 Defence and foreign policy Common market and 
currency 
Economic relations 
Djukanovic 
Platform 
(28.12.2000) 
Member state armies, military 
service in one’s member state. 
The Supreme Defence Council 
(i.e. the three presidents) 
decides by consensus. Rotation 
of the defence and foreign 
ministers of the member states 
as defence minister of the 
Union. Foreign policy of the 
Union to facilitate the 
integration in Euro-Atlantic 
organisations. 
Common, externally 
convertible currency and free 
flow of goods, capital, people 
and information. Each 
member-state has its won 
central bank and retains the 
right to have its own monetary 
system. 
Single customs area without 
internal tariffs, harmonisation 
of customs policies and tariffs. 
Kostunica-
Djindjic 
Platform 
(10.01.2001) 
Defence by the federation and 
the federal army. Foreign 
policy as a federal prerogative 
with the possibility for the 
republics to exercise 
international economic 
integration and regional co-
operation autonomously. 
- - 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Agreement 
(14.03.2002) 
By the state. The Supreme 
Defence Council (i.e. the three 
presidents) decides by 
consensus. Conscripts serve in 
their own republic, unless they 
prefer otherwise.  
Harmonisation in trade and 
customs policies via EU 
economic system. Transitional 
harmonisation takes into 
account the interests of the 
member states. EU monitoring 
and assistance.  
Republics responsible for free 
flow of goods, capital, people 
and services as well as for 
functioning common market 
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Table 4 State Institutions and Decision-Making 
 
Assembly President, Court Council of Ministers 
Djukanovic 
Platform 
(28.12.2000) 
Unicameral - deputies elected 
on parity basis and within 
legislative competence of the 
member-states. Rotation of 
president and vice-president of 
the assembly 
Elected and dismissed by the 
Assembly with prior agreement 
of the Assemblies of the 
member-states. President of 
Union and President of the 
Council of Ministers from 
different member-states and 
represent political majority.  
Federal court 
President, Vice-President, 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Defence, Finance and 
Economic Relations. 
President/Vice-President, 
Ministers/Deputy-Ministers 
from different member-states 
Kostunica-
Djindjic 
Platform 
(10.01.2001) 
Bicameral – absolute majority 
in both chambers needed for 
fundamental federal decisions. 
General jurisdiction for both 
chambers. Chamber of 
Republics with equal number 
of deputies from federal units, 
elected in republican 
legislatures. Citizens of the 
federation elect Chamber of 
Citizens, mandatory minimum 
for Montenegro. 
Elected by the Federal 
Assembly, alternately from the 
two republics, dismissed only 
by ruling of Federal Court, 
nominates senior state officials.  
Federal court as constitutional 
and regular court 
Prime minister elected 
alternately from the two 
republics. The ministers are 
accountable to the prime 
minister, who is accountable to 
the Federal Assembly.  
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Agreement 
(14.03.2002) 
Unicameral – election laws by 
member states, certain positive 
discrimination for Montenegro. 
Mechanism against the 
outvoting of member states. 
Elected by parliament, 
proposes and directs council of 
ministers  
Court as constitutional and 
administrative court 
Foreign affairs, defence, 
international economic 
relations, internal economic 
relations as well as the 
protection of human and 
minority rights. Ministers 
proposed and directed by the 
president, rotation of 
ministers/deputy-ministers in 
foreign affairs and defence. 
 
KEY DOCUMENTS 
   
Government of Montenegro (28 
December 2000) Platform for talks 
with Government of Serbia on new 
relations between the two states 
I. Past Montenegro-Serbia Relations in FRY  
1. On the grounds of the historical and 
centuries-old sovereignty of Montenegro and 
the inalienable right of Montenegro to self-
determination, verified by the decisions of the 
United Nations and by the Badinter 
Commission and proclaimed by the 
Montenegrin Constitution of 1992: 
* The Citizens of Montenegro decided to form 
a common state with Serbia – the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The Citizens of 
Montenegro wanted and expected FRY to be a 
democratic community of equal Republics and 
equal citizens. Nevertheless, many abuses of 
the FRY institutions and bodies occurred 
during its existence, which resulted in 
undemocratic relations and gross violations of 
the Constitutional principles of equality of the 
Republics and citizens, at the expense of 
Montenegro.  
* After the parliamentary elections in 
Montenegro in May 1998, the Federal 
Government and the Chamber of the Republics 
of the Assembly of the FRY were constituted 
in a fashion that flagrantly violated the FRY 
Constitution, the constitutional rights and the 
will of the citizens of Montenegro expressed in 
these legal, legitimate and democratic 
elections. All federal institutions, and in 
particular the judicial and the administrative 
ones, were functioning and taking decisions in 
contravention to the legal order of the FRY, 
carrying out undemocratic and unitary policies 
of the then federal administration and thus 
violating individual and collective rights of 
citizens of the Republic of Montenegro. The 
most blatant manifestations of such policies 
were the unconstitutional declaration of state 
of war and the abuses thereof, as well as 
decisions that ignored fundamental rights of 
citizens of Montenegro, which must never be 
violated, not even during circumstances of 
war.  
* The FRY competences in the field of foreign 
affairs, border crossings and control of goods, 
services and passenger transport across the 
borders, as well as the status of foreigners were 
discriminative and with elements of 
obstruction against Montenegro.  
* The formulation and implementation of the 
FRY foreign policy was conducted without 
participation of and contrary to the political 
positions of the Montenegrin authorities, as 
well as in defiance of modern concepts of 
international relations. The equal participation 
principle of Montenegro and Serbia in 
appointments and staff recruiting for the 
diplomatic and consular missions was not 
respected either.  
* The principle of a single Yugoslav market 
was being constantly infringed upon, such 
infringements involving illegitimate 
checkpoints with the character of customs 
posts between the two Republics and violation 
of basic rights of citizens of Montenegro. Their 
property was being confiscated; the flow of 
goods and capital was being prevented, as well 
as free entrepreneurship and equal treatment of 
economic entities.  
* The monetary and the foreign exchange 
policy were conducted without Montenegro’s 
equal participation in decision-making and 
control, and in contravention to the 
Constitution and the Laws, especially in 
issuing new money and setting interest rates.  
* The VJ (Yugoslav Army) was particularly 
misused, especially its commanding system 
(military and civilian). The Montenegrin 
President was excluded from the commanding 
system and the VJ became an instrument used 
for political purposes with the intention of 
destabilising Montenegro’s legitimate 
authorities.  
* After the Presidential elections in 
Montenegro there were encouragements and 
attempts to overthrow by force the 
democratically, legally and legitimately elected 
Montenegrin authorities.  
* On 6 July 2000 illegal and illegitimate 
changes of the FRY Constitution were carried 
out; they meant constitutional violence against 
Montenegro. These changes instituted 
procedures for the election of the FRY 
President and the Chamber of the Republics of 
the Federal Assembly appropriate for a unitary 
rather than a composite state. Montenegro, 
given its significantly smaller constituency, 
lost the possibility to influence the election of 
the Federal President. Also, now that the 
Republic Assemblies no longer have the right 
to elect deputies to the Chamber of the 
Republics, this Chamber has ceased to protect 
the interests of the Republics. In an exercise of 
constitutional violence, and without the 
obligatory agreement of the Republic 
Assemblies, federal electoral legislation was 
taken away from the republican and transferred 
to the federal competence. These changes 
highlighted the absence of a constitutional 
mechanism that could protect equality and 
sovereignty of Montenegro against political 
violence. 
2. Therefore, it is necessary to redefine the 
relations between Montenegro and Serbia on a 
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new basis. The fact that the Serbian 
Constitution has never been brought in line 
with the FRY Constitution (this has never been 
even attempted) makes the political conditions 
for restructuring the relationship between 
Montenegro and Serbia still more complicated. 
3. The FRY Constitution of 1992 cannot be a 
basis for establishing a new relationship 
between Montenegro and Serbia. 
* The relationship between the states of 
Montenegro and Serbia should be secured 
through new procedures. 
Montenegro has been seriously and 
responsibly preparing for talks with Serbia on 
the subject of the basis, framework and 
directions of their future relationship. This 
relationship can only be based on: 
* The historical, state, national and cultural 
identity of the two states and two peoples, as 
well as on the sovereign right of citizens of 
both states to autonomously make decisions 
regarding their destiny.  
* The tasks of common interest to Montenegro 
and Serbia are to be entrusted to the Union and 
to be conducted on an equal footing and 
subjected to the same level of control.  
* On that ground, Montenegro offers the 
Platform for talks on a future Union, which 
should be based on a common interest of both 
states, as well as on the historical and current 
realities. 
II) The Character of a Future Union of the 
Internationally Recognised States of 
Montenegro and Serbia 
The starting point for a new Union of 
Montenegro and Serbia lies in the inalienable 
right of the citizens to decide upon their 
national and state destiny. This can be the only 
basis for determining the common interest of 
the Union of Montenegro and Serbia. This will 
create conditions to overcome the obstacles in 
their mutual relationship. 
* Montenegro and Serbia will be independent 
and internationally recognized states.  
* The independence of Montenegro and Serbia 
will be decided through a referendum of their 
citizens, who have the sovereign right to 
determine the destiny of their state.  
* Independent and internationally recognised 
Montenegro and Serbia will constitute the 
Union of two states by referendum vote of 
their citizens.  
* Montenegro and Serbia shall form a Union, 
aware of the common interest and the utility of 
such association, building a structure based on 
the principles and relations acceptable for both.  
* In this Union, the citizens, their associations, 
companies and institutions should have a wide 
range of opportunities to fulfil their needs and 
interests. Instead of the hierarchical pyramid of 
alienated and bureaucratised state institutions, 
the new model of the Union of Montenegro 
and Serbia should provide decision-making on 
clear and easily applicable principles 
governing conduct of the states.  
* Montenegro and Serbia, independent from 
each other regarding questions of national and 
state sovereignty, in fulfilling the common 
interest should function without centralisation.  
* For the Union of Serbia and Montenegro the 
only acceptable concept is the one that has as 
the basis the constitutional position of the 
states as genuine holders of sovereignty, 
delegating part of their competences, those that 
can effectively be carried out in the Union on 
an equal footing and in a rational manner. 
III. Principles of the Union of Montenegro 
and Serbia 
The principles of the Union: 
* The equality within the Union of states  
* Each state conducting in a sovereign fashion 
all the state affairs within its competence.  
* The Union carrying out only those activities 
entrusted to it.  
* Competences of the Union to be interpreted 
restrictively  
* Competences of the Union to be performed, 
as a rule, by bodies of the member states and 
exceptionally by bodies of the Union.  
* Bodies of the Union constituted on the basis 
of the principle of equality and consensual 
decision-making.  
* Open society  
* Respect of international standards, human 
rights and freedoms, including special minority 
rights  
* Market economy with domination of private 
ownership and private entrepreneurship  
* Rule of law  
* Constitutionality and legality of Montenegro 
and Serbia. 
IV. Competences of the Union of 
Montenegro and Serbia 
The competences of the Union should be 
considerably narrower than today’s 
competences of the FRY. This should 
minimise potential conflicts, while at the same 
time expressing a new character of the Union. 
The Union would have the following 
responsibilities: 
* Defence and external security of the Union  
* Foreign policy of the Union  
* Securing a common market and a convertible 
currency 
Given the negative experience in the 
functioning of the FRY bodies, the bodies of 
the Union and the procedure for their 
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formation and decision-making should be 
defined by an act of the Union 
1. Defence and External Security of the Union 
* Montenegro and Serbia shall have their own 
armies  
* The army must be professional; the military 
service shall be done in one’s member state 
and shall not last longer than six months  
* The common activities of the army, of 
importance for both Montenegro and Serbia, 
shall be under command of the President of the 
Union, exclusively on the basis of decisions of 
the Supreme Defence Council.  
* The Supreme Defence Council shall decide 
by consensus of the member states presidents 
and the president of the Union  
* The president of the state shall be in 
command of the army of the member state of 
which he is the president  
* Having in mind the character of the Union it 
is suggested that defence ministers rotate every 
second year within a-four-year term of office. 
2. Foreign Policy of the Union 
Member states, as separate persons in terms of 
international law, shall be autonomous in 
formulating and conducting foreign policy and 
international cooperation and shall do so in 
accordance with their constitutional capacity, 
their principles, goals and priorities. Foreign 
policy activity of the Union shall be aimed at 
facilitating integration of its member states 
into the international community, particularly 
into the Euro-Atlantic organizations and 
institutions, and making possible a better and 
more successful international cooperation and 
development. To this end the Union shall be 
engaged in harmonising and coordinating the 
policies, priorities and activities of its member 
states. 
Foreign policy activity of the Union shall be 
harmonised and coordinated according to the 
foreign policy priorities, tasks and activities of 
its member states. The member states shall 
participate in these affairs on an equal basis 
and shall have equal control in the matters of 
the Union with clearly differentiated 
responsibilities of the Union from those of the 
member states. 
Within the Council of Ministers of the Union, 
the functions of the Coordinator - Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Union shall be rotated 
between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of 
the two member-states, each of them 
performing the function during a 2-year period. 
The Coordinator - Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the Union, shall perform, with the assistance 
of the Union’s institutions, the tasks of 
harmonisation and coordination of foreign 
policy and of the activities of the member-
states of the Union. The Coordinator - Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of the Union shall discuss, 
in regular consultations with the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the other member state, all 
foreign policy and international cooperation 
issues of common interest. 
The member states shall be autonomous in 
establishing their diplomatic and consular 
offices, appointing ambassadors and consuls 
general in accordance with their policy, 
interests and priorities. In mutual consultations 
and within the Union they shall coordinate and 
harmonise their policy, interests and activities 
in this sphere, and discuss the manner and 
conditions for joint use of buildings and the 
overall infrastructure abroad. Also, one 
member-state shall entrust the other member-
state with the duties and tasks of representing 
her interests in certain countries and/or 
international organizations where one member-
state does not have an interest or possibilities 
for direct presence with her own 
diplomatic/consular office. 
3. Common Market and Convertible Currency 
The Union would have a common, externally 
convertible, currency and free flow of goods, 
capital, people and information. 
V. Union Institutions, Electoral Procedures 
and Decision-making Processes 
The responsibilities under the competence of 
the Union would be conducted through the 
Assembly of the Union, President of the Union 
and the Council of Ministers. 
1. The Assembly of the Union 
The Assembly of the Union would have one 
‘House’ and the deputies would be chosen on a 
parity basis within the framework of exclusive 
legislative competence of the member-states. 
The deputies would be obliged to keep the 
Assemblies of their member-states informed 
on the approved agenda. 
The President of the Assembly and the Vice-
President shall be from different member-
states, and shall rotate every 2 years, within a 
4-year term of office. 
The member-state, through its Assembly, 
would have the right to initiate a separate 
protection procedure regarding the acts from 
the competence of the Assembly of the Union. 
2. President of the Union 
The President of the Union shall represent the 
Union. 
The President of the Union shall be elected to 
and dismissed from the post by the Assembly 
of the Union, subject to prior agreement of the 
Assemblies of member- states. 
The President of the Union and the President 
of the Council of Ministers shall be from 
different member-states and shall represent the 
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‘majority parties’ or coalitions in the member 
states. 
At the request of the Government members 
from the Social Democratic Party (SDP) the 
Government has taken note of the position of 
SDP that office of President of the Union is not 
in accordance with the character of a Union of 
internationally recognized states of 
Montenegro and Serbia. 
3. The Council of Ministers of the Union 
The Council of Ministers of the Union shall 
perform the assigned executive tasks within 
the competence of the Union and shall include 
the President, the Vice-president and the 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defence, 
Finance, and Economic Relations. 
The Vice-president of the Council of Ministers 
shall be from a different member-state with 
respect to that of the President, just as the 
Deputy Ministers shall be from a different 
member-state with respect to the Ministers. 
The member-state, through its government, 
would have the right to initiate a special 
protection procedure regarding the acts from 
the competence of the Council of Ministers. 
VI. The Basis of the Economic Relations 
between Serbia and Montenegro 
In the sphere of economic relations the Union 
will have: 
* A common market: free flow of goods, 
capital, people and information in the territory 
of the Union with protected ‘property rights’, 
freedom of establishment of economic entities, 
as well as freedom of contract.  
* A single customs area: the Union shall be a 
single customs area without internal tariffs, in 
conformity with WTO regulations deriving 
from developing country status. 
The customs system shall be under the 
competence of the member states. Customs 
policy and tariff rates could be harmonised 
through special agreements that would secure 
specific interests of the member states 
(strategic goods, strategic development ideas, 
customs free zones and off-shore companies, 
etc) 
* A common convertible currency: The 
currency of the Union shall have external 
convertibility and shall be backed by reliable 
hard currency reserves. 
Convertibility would be defined by an act of 
the Union. 
Each member-state shall retain the right to its 
own monetary system should the monetary 
union prove a constraint to the realisation of its 
strategic commitments due to impaired 
monetary stability or influence of other factors. 
Each member state shall have its own central 
bank. 
 
President Kostunica's Proposal for 
the Reconstruction of Yugoslavia 
 
(published in Tanjug, 10 January 2001; 
endorsed by the Democratic Opposition of 
Serbia) 
 
Throughout their contemporary history, Serbia 
and Montenegro aspired to state unification. 
They deemed the creation of a joint state their 
natural objective and a key precondition for 
materializing their interests and securing their 
internal and external freedoms. There is no 
doubt that our joint efforts produced many 
good things, but it is also true that it is only 
now that the road to a comprehensive and 
democratic transformation of the country has 
opened to us, and that we have just entered the 
process of creating conditions for proper 
constitutional restructuring of relations in the 
federation and the establishment of a stable 
joint state. 
There are a large number of historical and 
actual reasons in favor of the preservation and 
restructuring of the Serbian-Montenegrin joint 
state. They exceed by far those in favor of the 
separation of the two republics, a larger part of 
the executive authorities in Montenegro have 
been insisting on. The reasons for preserving 
the state alliance are deep historic links 
between the two peoples, their language and 
tradition, religion and culture, firm family and 
property ties, and those granted citizens one 
republic, who enjoy permanent residence in the 
other or have inhabited it for quite a long time. 
What Serbia and Montengro also share are a 
single economic environment, joint 
development interests, as well as the interests 
of common defense. Another important fact is 
that Serbia and Montenegro are equally multi-
ethnic and multi-cultural states, with 
approximately for identical population share of 
different language, religion and culture. After 
the democratic changes, they are supposed to 
share the state responsibility for minorities and 
guarantee their position by sound 
constitutional and legal mechanisms. In less 
than two months, the FRY managed to 
improve considerably its standing within the 
international community. Moreover, it gained 
the reputation of a country international 
organisations can rely on in establishing 
understanding and cooperation in the region. 
The task of restructuring the state is 
responsible and difficult indeed. This task, 
however, is not unsolvable if there is a political 
goodwill and readiness for compromises. We 
should not be afraid of the fact that 
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Montenegro and Serbia, as old European 
states, internationally recognised two centuries 
ago, have every right to seek to safeguard their 
important national attributives in their joint 
state as well. Quite the contrary, it is precisely 
this fact that can make the challenge easier, 
because the need for both federal units for 
political autonomy within the state alliance can 
be fulfilled permanently by modern and 
specific federal solutions. After all, federalism 
emerged in contemporary history as a response 
to the question of how to organise complex 
states that comprise several political units. 
Federalism responds to their readiness to unite 
on the basis of common goals, while 
maintaining their autonomy and specific 
national attributives in the spheres falling 
within their autonomous jurisdiction. Each 
federation resolved this problem in its own 
way, having no model at all, since it was 
always a specific case of the creation and 
operation of a complex state. Just like all 
others, the federation of Serbia and 
Montenegro is also specific. This means that it 
has to identify individual and atypical 
solutions for its specific internal structure. 
What has always been pointed out as the major 
obstacle to a healthy federal balance is the 
existing difference in the size and population 
of the two federal units. For that reason, the 
system is allegedly to incline to the two 
extremes, both of them being equally 
dangerous to the operation of the system. 
Basically, we are talking about the tendency of 
centralisation on the one hand, and the 
tendency of internal blockade on the other. To 
say the truth, the two tendencies had torn apart 
the present-day two-member federation indeed, 
all until they began to question its existence. 
However, this is not the consequence of the 
federal structure itself, as the advocates of 
Montenegro's secession are trying to prove, but 
rather the fact that the existing Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is the 
result of party deal made by the then ruling 
parties in Serbia and Montenegro, which, with 
the passage of time, they ceased to comply 
with themselves. We now have a unique 
chance of devising better constitutional 
solutions, endorse them in a legitimate 
procedure, and, as democrats and legalists, 
abide by them consistently. 
It is precisely because of the set structure of 
the Serbian- Montenegrin federation, and the 
existing disproportion in size, the concept of 
functional federation, adapted to the local 
circumstances, is the most purposeful one. 
There are three basic characteristics of such a 
concept. 
1) The number of functions to be performed at 
the federal level should be minimal, basically 
defined by the federal units' need for the joint 
and effective resolution of issues of common 
interest; 
2) Cooperation between federal and republican 
bodies must exist in the processes of decision-
making and performing joint functions alike. 
3) All functions that are not referred to the 
federal level are performed autonomously by 
the republics, which also means that they can 
establish direct cooperation in the joint 
performance of those functions. 
These three important characteristics will 
secure that the two following basic principles 
be exercised in theory and practice alike; the 
equality of the federal units and the operability 
of the federation as a whole. 
A) Power-sharing and operations of the 
federation 
The number of federal powers is defined by 
the elementary functions that make a federal 
state operable in its internal and external public 
life. these are: 
* protection of basic rights and freedoms, with 
the necessary minimum of social rights;  
* foreign policy;  
* national defense;  
* basics of economic system;  
* transportation and communications. 
These are also the minimal powers a state 
should exercise if strategically oriented to 
European integration, which is no doubt the 
wish and substantial orientation of the citizens 
of Serbia and Montenegro. 
In order to secure simultaneously the equality 
of the two federal units and the operability of 
the federation as a whole, I propose several 
principles that would pave the way to the 
establishment of a system of multiple balances. 
The first principle implies the bi-cameral 
adoption of all fundamental federal decisions - 
laws and other regulations, on the basis of 
absolute majority in both chambers. Due to the 
specific structure of our federation, the upper 
house, as a body directly representing the 
republics, should have general jurisdiction, just 
like the lower house. 
When it comes to the exercising of federal 
powers, a difference should be made between 
those fully exercised by federal bodies - 
legislative, executive and judicial, and those 
exercised jointly by federal and republican 
organs. In the first case, all regulations are 
adopted and implemented by the federal 
bodies. 
They include the following federal powers: 
* foreign policy  
* national defense,  
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* monetary system,  
* customs system,  
* transportation,  
* obligation law,  
* securities. 
When it comes to implementation of the laws 
relevant to the above-listed, the Federal 
Government may delegate its executive power 
to the republican executive and administrative 
organs. 
In the second case of mixed powers, the 
federal parliament is to endorse framework 
laws only that are made concrete by the 
republics' legislatures, and those legal 
regulations are implemented by their executive 
and administrative organs. These powers are as 
follows: 
* basic rights and freedoms, including the 
protection of minority rights, as well as basic 
social rights,  
* property relations,  
* taxation system,  
* banking system,  
* trade law,  
* pensions,  
* insurance of property and persons. 
When it comes to foreign policy and 
international relations, the future federal 
constitution should allow for the possibility 
that the republics exercise autonomously 
different forms of international cooperation in 
the spheres of economic relations and diverse 
modes of regional integrations. 
B) Federal Institutions 
Their composition and powers, as well as the 
way in which they are elected and the way in 
which they make decisions should make the 
federal institutions a consistent reflection of 
the functional federation concept. 
As the supreme representative and legislative 
body of the federation, the Federal Assembly 
should have bi-cameral structure, that is, 
comprise the Chamber of Republics and the 
Chamber of Citizens. It is understood that the 
Chamber of Republics has the equal number of 
deputies from the federal units, who represent 
the interests of their respective republics in the 
chamber. Having in mind the local 
circumstances, it would be most purposeful if 
the deputies to the upper house be elected in 
republican legislatures in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality, so that their 
composition could reflect the will of the voters 
expressed through the structure of the 
republican parliaments. Given the fact that this 
chamber has general jurisdiction in the 
parliamentary decision-making, its deputies, 
even though they are representatives of the 
republics, should not have imperative 
mandates. The renouncement of their 
imperative mandates would help the 
parliamentary life develop, which is the non 
sine qua condition for each and every form of 
democracy, including that in federations. This 
does not mean that the legislatures will not 
establish guidelines for the activity of deputies 
to the Chamber of Republics. Such guidelines 
are assumed in federations, but not with the 
intention of blocking the decision-making 
process in federal assemblies. 
The Chamber of Citizens of the Federal 
Assembly should exercise the constitutional 
principle of equality of the citizens of the 
federation. Given the specific structure of the 
federation, a corrective mechanism is needed 
here in the form of a clause specifying the 
smallest mandatory number of representatives 
of a republic to the chamber. Although this 
might provoke the objection that this would 
affect to a degree the principle of equality of 
the citizens represented in the chamber, I am 
convinced that a certain correction of the "one 
man-one vote" principle would be beneficial to 
the parliamentary life. This would secure that 
the smaller federal unit be represented in 
parliamentary committees and commissions 
without exception. Furthermore, this would 
facilitate the election of the prime minister, 
when he/she is elected from Montenegro. 
Needless to say, the deputies to the lower 
house have free mandates, regardless of 
election units they are elected in, and they 
represent the interests of the federation as a 
whole. 
It is necessary that the joint state of Serbia and 
Montenegro should have the President of the 
Republic. The president should have the 
powers of representation and nominate senior 
state officials in the executive branch and 
judiciary. The president would also chair the 
Supreme Defense Council that would also 
include the presidents of the republics. The 
president of the Republic should be elected by 
the Federal Assembly in its regular decision-
making procedure. The dismissal of the 
president, however, is to be carried out solely 
on the basis of a ruling by the Federal Court 
that would determine whether the president 
violated the FRY Constitution by his conduct. 
The President of the Republic would be elected 
alternately from the two republics. 
The Federal Government should be organised 
following the chancellor model. It is the most 
appropriate mode for the existing overall 
organisation of the federal authority. Given the 
small number of federal powers and the 
complexity of the decision-making process, it 
is of utmost importance that the executive 
branch and its major organ, the government, be 
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organised in the most efficient manner 
possible. In this context, it is only the prime 
minister, elected alternately from the two 
republics, that accounts to the Federal 
Assembly, while ministers account to him/her. 
The ministerial composition depends solely on 
the choice by the prime minister, taking utmost 
care about the equality of the two republics. 
The government should be independent, 
responsible to the assembly and rational. Apart 
from the prime minister, it should include only 
five ministers in charge of the federal 
ministries of justice, defense, foreign relations, 
finance and transportation. The Federal 
Government is elected by the two 
parliamentary chambers, but its dismissal will 
require a majority in one of them only. 
Proceeding from the specific federal structure, 
it is likely that the government will be formed 
by inter-republican party coalitions, because 
this is the only way for the government to 
secure a stable majority in both houses. 
The federation should have a single court only, 
the Federal Court, which would perform both 
the constitutional and regular court functions. 
The usual constitutional and judicial control of 
constitutionality and legality on the federal 
level is also provided for. In the sphere of 
regular judiciary, the Federal Court would 
decide solely on extraordinary legal 
instruments, after all legal instruments within 
the two republics' judicial system are 
exhausted. 
Given the fact that the federation will join all 
important international conventions to protect 
basic rights and freedoms, the citizen and other 
legal entities will be able to initiate court 
proceedings in order to protect their violated 
rights with competent international courts as 
well. 
Although the federation has minimal functions 
and rational bodies for their implementation, it 
should dislocate the headquarters of some of 
its institutions. Some of them would be in 
Podgorica or Cetinje. 
Finally, draft constitutional amendments 
should by all means specify procedure by 
which the constitution is to be amended. 
Bearing in mind that in this concept the 
exponents of sovereignty (constituency power) 
are the citizens of the republics, a procedure 
should be defined to make it sure that their will 
is expressed efficiently. In this context, when it 
comes to changes relevant to the issue of the 
state statuses of the republics and the 
federation, the citizens of the republics will be 
those deciding the final instance. 
I believe that a constitutional concept like this 
can secure to the utmost the common interests 
of Serbia and Montenegro and at the same time 
make it possible for the republics to achieve 
their own, special interests. However, even the 
best and most optimal of constitutional 
concepts will not be implemented in reality if 
the two basic preconditions are not fulfilled - 
political goodwill and the spirit of the rule of 
law. Once they are met, the citizens will be 
able to enjoy their rights and freedoms, and 
political power will be curbed by legal 
regulations formulated by the constitution and 
laws. This is also the only way for Serbia and 
Montenegro, on the one hand, and their joint 
state, on the other, to become part of modern 
Europe, with a good chance of being admitted 
to the democratic and prosperous community 
of European peoples and states. 
 
Proceeding Points for the 
Restructuring of Relations between 
Serbia and Montenegro 
 
Beograd 15.03.2002 
 
Agreement on Principles. The Agreement on 
Principles of relations between Serbia and 
Montenegro within the state union shall be 
signed by participants in the talks: the 
President of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, the Deputy Federal Prime 
Minister, the President of the Republic of 
Montenegro, the Serbian and Montenegrin 
Premiers and, as a witness, the EU High 
Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. The document shall be 
submitted for debate to the Parliaments of 
member states and the Federal Parliament. 
Constitutional Charter. On the basis of 
opinions put forward in parliamentary debates, 
that is, parliamentary conclusions, a 
constitutional commission, whose members 
shall be delegated by the Parliaments of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Serbia 
and Montenegro, shall draft the Constitutional 
Charter, the highest legal act of the state union 
of Serbia and Montenegro. The text of this act 
shall be adopted by the republican parliaments 
first, and than submitted to the Federal 
Parliament. Such procedure would reaffirm the 
elements of Serbian and Montenegrin 
statehood, stemming from the present-day 
factual situation and the historic rights of the 
two member states. 
Provision on Reconsideration. Upon the 
expiration of a three-year period, the member 
states shall be entitled to instituting 
proceedings for a change of the state status, 
that is, withdrawal from the state union. If 
Montenegro withdraws from the state union, 
international documents related to the FRY, 
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the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 in 
particular, shall relate to and fully apply on 
Serbia as its successor. A member state that 
uses this right, shall not inherit the right to 
international and legal status, and all debatable 
issues shall be regulated specifically between 
the state successor and the newly established 
state. If in a referendum process both member 
states declare themselves in favour of a change 
of the state status (independence), all debatable 
issues shall be resolved in succession 
proceedings, as was done in the case of former 
Yugoslavia. The Laws on Referendum shall be 
adopted by the member states, taking full 
account of internationally recognised 
democratic standards. 
The name of the state: Serbia and 
Montenegro. 
Institutions of Serbia and Montenegro: the 
Parliament, the President, the Council of 
Ministers and the Court. 
Parliament: A unicameral parliament 
providing certain positive discrimination for 
Montenegrin representatives. The Laws on the 
Election of Representatives to the Parliament 
of Serbia and Montenegro shall be adopted by 
the member states, in compliance with the 
principles defined by the Constitutional 
Charter. Mechanisms to protect against 
outvoting of member states shall be provided 
for. 
President of Serbia and Montenegro: The 
President, elected by the Parliament of Serbia 
and Montenegro, shall propose the 
composition of the Council of Ministers and 
direct its work. 
Council of Ministers: The Council of 
Ministers shall be composed of five 
departments: foreign affairs, defence, 
international economic relations, internal 
economic relations and protection of human 
and minority rights. The competences of the 
ministries shall be defined in detail 
subsequently. 
The Court of Serbia and Montenegro: The 
Court shall have constitutional-court and 
administrative court functions, and shall deal 
with harmonisation of court practice. The 
administrative court function shall be exercised 
in relation with administrative acts of the 
ministries of the Council of Ministers. The 
Court shall take legal views and give opinions 
related to the harmonisation of court practice. 
The Court is not an appellate court and has an 
equal number of judges from the member 
states. 
The Army: The Army of Serbia and 
Montenegro shall be under the command of the 
Supreme Defence Council, composed of three 
presidents. The Supreme Defence Council 
shall make decisions by consensus. Conscripts 
shall serve the army on the territory of their 
respective member states, with the possibility 
of serving on the territory of the other member 
state, if they wish so. 
Elections and Appointments: Upon the 
promulgation of the Constitutional Charter 
under the specified procedure, elections shall 
take place, the Parliament of Serbia and 
Montenegro shall be constituted, the President 
of Serbia and Montenegro shall be elected, as 
well as members of the Council of Ministers 
and judges of the Court of Serbia and 
Montenegro. It shall also be possible to 
provide for rotating during a term in office. (In 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Defence, the minister and his/her 
deputy from different member states shall take 
turns when one half of the term in office 
expires). In representing the member states in 
international organisations (UN, OSCE, EU 
and the Council of Europe), parity shall be 
provided for through rotation, whereas special 
models for representation shall be defined for 
international financial organisations. In 
diplomatic and consular representative offices 
of Serbia and Montenegro abroad, a special 
agreement shall be made on proportionate 
representation of the member states. The 
Constitutional Charter shall be submitted to the 
Parliaments for deliberation by the end of June 
2002 at the latest. 
Dislocation of federal institutions. Some 
federal institutions can be headquartered in 
Podgorica. 
Constitutional reconstruction of the 
member states. Within the activities aimed at 
the promulgation of the Constitutional Charter 
of Serbia and Montenegro, the member states 
shall amend their respective constitutions in 
compliance with the Constitutional Charter of 
Serbia and Montenegro or promulgate new 
constitutions by the end of 2002 at the latest. 
Economic sphere. The level of economic 
reforms reached in Serbia and Montenegro 
shall be a proceeding point for regulating 
mutual economic relations. The member states 
shall be responsible for unhindered operation 
of a common market, including the free flow 
of people, goods, services and capital. 
Harmonisation of the economic systems of the 
member states with the EU economic system 
shall overcome the existing differences, 
primarily in the spheres of trade and customs 
policies. In both regards, economic reforms 
that have already been carried out in the 
member states shall be taken into full account, 
while solutions that would provide for the 
quickest integration into the European Union 
shall be accepted. Transitional solutions in 
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harmonising trade and customs policies should 
take into account the interests of the member 
states. The European Union shall assist in the 
accomplishment of these objectives and 
monitor the process on a regular basis. The 
modalities for the achievement of these 
objectives shall be elaborated in parallel with 
the Constitutional Charter. If one of the 
member states believes that the other does not 
live up with commitments under this 
agreement concerning the operation of a 
common market and the harmonisation of 
trade and customs policies, it shall reserve the 
right to raise the matter with the EU in the 
context of the Stabilisation and Association 
Process with the view to the adoption of 
appropriate measures. The EU shall guarantee 
that, if other conditions and criteria for the 
Stabilisation and Association Process are 
fulfilled, the agreed principles of constitutional 
organisation shall not be an obstacle to a rapid 
conclusion of the Agreement on Association 
and Stabilisation. 
 
President of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia 
Vojislav Kostunica  
Deputy Federal Prime Minister Miroljub Labus  
President of the Republic of Montenegro Milo 
Djukanovic  
Premier of the Republic of Serbia Zoran 
Djindjic  
Premier of the Republic of Montenegro Filip 
Vujanovic  
Witnessed by EU High Representative for 
Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana 
 
Belgrade, March 14, 2002 
 
 
